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“A DELICATE INQUIRY”: FOREIGN POLICY CONCERNS REVIVE 
THE REVENUE RULE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT AND BAR 
FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FROM SUING BIG TOBACCO 
INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, a pack of cigarettes in France cost approximately $6.40 (U.S.), a 
fifty percent increase from 2002.1  This increase reflected, in part, the French 
government’s effort to reduce the ill-effects of smoking by raising cigarette 
taxes.2  France was not alone; over the course of the previous decade, other 
European nations had instituted significant cigarette tax increases of their 
own.3  In addition to raising revenue and discouraging consumers from using 
tobacco, the cigarette tax increases have had the unintended effect of 
increasing black market activity.4  According to some experts, as much as 
twenty percent of cigarettes imported into the domestic markets of some 
European countries are thought to be lost to illicit transactions.5  Cigarette 
smuggling is estimated to have cost European nations $1.5 billion in revenue 
over the last ten years.6  Much of this smuggling activity has been blamed on 
efforts by United States cigarette-makers, who are struggling to earn a profit in 
an increasingly health-conscious European consumer market.7 
 
 1. Elaine Sciolino, For the Tobacconists of France, Life’s a Pack of Trouble, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 13, 2003, at A4. 
 2. Peter Ford, Europe’s Smokers Feel Heat, CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, Oct. 24, 2003, 
at W1, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2003/1024/p01s04-woeu.html.  France increased 
cigarette taxes incrementally over three years.  Id. 
 3. See id. (noting the cigarette tax increase of 55% over five years in Great Britain); Steven 
Lee Meyers, For Europe’s Sake, Spotting Moonshine Among Swans, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2005, at 
A4 (noting the cigarette tax increase of 15% in Lithuanian over one year).  Ireland went beyond a 
tax increase and instituted a ban on smoking in many public areas, including the workplace.  
Ford, supra note 2.  Holland and Norway also instituted bans but included many exceptions.  Id. 
 4. Anne Macdiarmid, Black Market Cigarettes May Cloud Future, BALTIMORE SUN, May 
31, 1998, at 4F.  The nations that make up the European Union are particularly susceptible to 
cigarette smuggling because of the nations’ close proximity to each other and the wide disparity 
in cigarette taxes between neighboring countries.  Suzanne Daley, Europeans Suing Big Tobacco 
in U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 7, 2000, at A1. 
 5. See Daley, supra note 4. 
 6. See id.  Tax avoidance schemes are estimated to cost foreign governments worldwide 
over $500 billion annually.  Tax Justice Network, Tax Us If You Can, http://www.taxjustice.net/ 
cms/front_content.php?idcat=30 (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 7. See Daley, supra note 4. 
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In an effort to recover part of this lost revenue, foreign governments have 
turned to United States law.8  The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt 
Organizations Act (RICO) criminalizes a wide-range of smuggling schemes, 
including those designed to evade taxes.9  RICO also provides a private 
enforcement mechanism for parties who are injured by conduct that amounts to 
a RICO violation.10  As an incentive to individuals and corporations to make 
use of the private enforcement mechanism, civil RICO entitles a prevailing 
party to treble damages based on the monetary injury suffered due to the 
racketeering activity.11 
But foreign governments are generally barred from recovering tax revenue 
in federal court.  A claim that enforces foreign tax law raises a number of 
concerns.12  First, the Constitution assigns the duty of dealing with matters of 
foreign policy to the executive branch.13  Therefore, judicial review of a 
foreign tax claim is said to violate the constitutional principle of separation of 
powers.14  Second, assigned the responsibility of deciding matters of domestic 
law, federal courts are said to have no obligation to clog their dockets with 
cases based on foreign tax law.15  Third, because judges in the federal court 
system are not trained in foreign tax law, federal courts are said to lack 
competence to review foreign tax claims.16  In recognition of these concerns, 
the revenue rule doctrine precludes domestic courts from enforcing foreign tax 
 
 8. Id.  Other than seeking a remedy through U.S. law, foreign governments often lack 
tenable options.  See Lena Ayoub, Nike Just Does It—And Why the United States Shouldn’t: The 
United States’ Obligation to Hold MNCs Accountable for Their Labor Rights Violations Abroad, 
11 DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 395, 422 (1999) (positing that foreign governments often ignore labor rights 
violations by American corporations abroad out of economic considerations).  Even if extradition 
proceedings were successful, the odds of recovering a judgment from a U.S. multinational 
corporation in a court of foreign jurisdiction are slim.  See id.; see also Hanson Hosein, 
Unsettling: Bhopal and the Resolution of International Disputes Involving an Environmental 
Disaster, 16 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 285, 300–01 (1993) (noting that the Indian legal system 
does not recognize the same injuries to personal rights as the U.S. legal system). 
 9. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–1968 (2000) (as amended by Pub. L. No. 107-56, § 813, 115 Stat. 
272, 383 (2001)). 
 10. § 1964(c). 
 11. Id. 
 12. See Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 137 
(2d Cir. 2001) (Calibrisi, J., dissenting). 
 13. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–2. 
 14. See United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 15. See infra notes 109–114 and accompanying text. 
 16. See infra notes 115–120 and accompanying text.  Another reason given for barring 
foreign tax claims is that the federal court system is simply busy enough as it is.  See John W. 
Wade, On Frivolous Litigation: A Study of Tort Liability and Procedural Sanctions, 14 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 433, 435–36 (1986) (blaming court clog on “the continued increase in population, the so-
called litigation explosion, the substantial increase in very complex cases involving multiple 
parties, the influence of inflation on damage verdicts, and the steadily broadening application of 
the law of torts” (citations omitted)). 
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law.17  According to Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, “Courts in 
the United States are not required to recognize or to enforce judgments for the 
collection of taxes, fines, or penalties rendered by the courts of other states.”18 
It is not clear, however, whether civil RICO claims brought by foreign 
governments to recover tax revenue are prohibited by the revenue rule.19  
These claims “enforce” a domestic statute as well as a foreign tax law.20  The 
revenue rule has never been interpreted to bar a claim that amounts to the 
enforcement of a domestic statute.21  Case law reaching back to the doctrine’s 
origins does not provide a clear answer to the question of whether the revenue 
rule bars a “mixed” claim; that is, a suit enforcing both a domestic statute and a 
foreign tax law.22 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals recently held that the revenue rule 
does bar a foreign government’s civil RICO claim when that claim is based on 
violations of the foreign government’s tax law.23  The European Community 
(the E.C.)24 brought a civil RICO claim against U.S. cigarette-maker R.J.R. 
Nabisco, Inc.25  The E.C.’s claim was based on allegations that the cigarette-
maker violated foreign tax law by smuggling cigarettes into the plaintiff-
governments’ territories.26  The revenue rule applied, according to the court, 
because the claim violated the separation of powers principle.27  Furthermore, 
by characterizing the E.C.’s claim as the extraterritorial enforcement of a 
foreign tax law, the court was concerned that the suit raised national 
sovereignty concerns.28 
This Note argues that the court’s reading of the revenue rule was 
unnecessarily broad and hence the court’s separation of powers and national 
 
 17. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 364 (2005). 
 18. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 483 (1987). 
 19. Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 138 (2d 
Cir. 2001) (Calibrisi, J., dissenting). 
 20. See id. at 138–39. 
 21. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 364. 
 22. Id. 
 23. European Community v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 24. The European Community, or the European Economic Community, was formed in 1957 
by Belgium, France, West Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.  Europa: The EU at 
a Glance: History of the European Union, http://europa.eu/abc/history/1957/index_en.htm (last 
visited Nov. 12, 2006).  Today, the E.C. is made up of 25 democratic nations.  See Europa: The 
EU at a Glance: European Governments On-Line, http://europa.eu/abc/governments/ 
index_en.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 25. European Community v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 355 F.3d 123, 128–29 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 26. Id. 
 27. European Community v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 28. See id.; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) 
(White, J., dissenting on other grounds) (“[O]ur courts customarily refuse to enforce the revenue 
and penal laws of a foreign state, since no country has an obligation to further the governmental 
interests of a foreign sovereign”). 
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sovereignty concerns were overstated.  The separation of powers concerns 
were minimized by the fact that the suit would have furthered the political 
branches’ avowed policies of assisting other nations in eradicating organized 
crime and terrorism.  Furthermore, the Second Circuit mischaracterized the 
claim as the extraterritorial application of foreign tax law and therefore 
overstated the national sovereignty concerns raised by the suit.  Because the 
suit only incidentally recognized foreign tax law, the court erred in concluding 
that the courts of one independent sovereign were being used to further the 
policy of a foreign sovereign.  Finally, this Note will show that the scope of the 
revenue rule should be reduced in the civil RICO context because the doctrine 
is an anachronism in today’s global economy. 
Composed of five parts, this Note examines the revenue rule doctrine and 
the Second Circuit’s decisions in European Community I and II.  Part I delves 
into the common law origins of the revenue rule.  Focusing primarily on Judge 
Learned Hand’s enunciation of the doctrine in Moore v. Mitchell,29 Part I also 
discusses the early appearances of the revenue rule in the United States.  Part II 
addresses the contemporary justifications for the revenue rule that evolved out 
of Judge Hand’s opinion.  Part III focuses on the recent decision in 
Pasquantino v. United States.30 where the Supreme Court seemed to reduce the 
scope of the revenue rule by approving of a wire fraud prosecution even 
though it incidentally recognized a foreign tax law.31  Part IV discusses the 
reasoning of the Second Circuit in European Community I and II.  Part V 
provides a critical analysis of the Second Circuit’s decisions. 
I.  THE REVENUE RULE: COMMON LAW ORIGINS AND EARLY AMERICAN 
VARIATIONS 
The earliest revenue rule decisions indicate that the doctrine is a judge-
made rule that has been modified depending on the dominant policy concerns 
of the time.32  The revenue rule was originally justified by economic 
concerns.33  More recently, the doctrine has been justified by the risk that 
judicial  
 
 29. 30 F.2d 600 (2d Cir. 1929). 
 30. 544 U.S. 349 (2005). 
 31. Id. 
 32. See Joseph M. West, Federal Fraud Prosecutions of Schemes to Defraud Foreign 
Sovereigns of Import Taxes, 50 WAYNE L. REV. 1061, 1061 (2004) (describing the revenue rule 
as a prudential consideration). 
 33. See, e.g., Boucher v. Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734) (Lord Harwicke, C.J.). 
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evaluation of policy-laden tax laws will have a negative impact on the 
relationship between foreign and domestic sovereigns.34  This section 
examines the evolution of the justifications for the revenue rule in the 
doctrine’s first 150 years. 
A. Lord Mansfield’s Commercial Justification 
The revenue rule made its first appearance in the eighteenth century in a 
trio of English common law decisions.35  At that time, England was jockeying 
with France for the position as the world’s superior trading power.36  
“Mercantilism” was the dominant economic policy.37  In other words, the 
world’s trade powers strove to create a favorable balance of exports and 
imports.38  International trade was a subject of increasing taxation by most 
nations.39  Some nations grew to rely on the tax revenue generated by trade; 
others implemented a policy of protectionism through a combination of import 
tax schemes and outright prohibition on trade with certain foreign nations.40  
Thus, foreign trade and revenue laws posed a potential barrier to England and 
other nations in search of commercial opportunities abroad.41 
Boucher v. Lawson42 exemplifies the judicial response to the threat posed 
by foreign trade laws to open markets.  In an effort to conserve precious metal, 
Portugal had banned the exportation of Portuguese gold in the early 1700s.43  
The merchant in Boucher had formed a contract with a Portuguese carrier for 
the delivery of a shipload of the protected commodity.44  After arriving in an 
English port, however, the carrier refused to deliver the gold to the English 
merchant.45  In response to a breach of contract suit by the merchant in a 
British court, the carrier raised the Portuguese ban on gold exportation as a 
 
 34. See, e.g., Moore, 30 F.2d at 603–04 (Hand, J., concurring). 
 35. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 36. See JOHN BOWLE, THE IMPERIAL ACHIEVEMENT: THE RISE AND TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE BRITISH EMPIRE 79–82 (1974).  For the British Empire, the middle part of the 18th century 
marked a period of tremendous expansion in international trade.  See JOHN B. OWEN, THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 1714–1815 132 (1974).  Between the years of 1714 and 1760, for 
example, domestic exports are estimated to have increased by more than 80 percent.  Id. 
 37. See MAURICE ASHLEY, A HISTORY OF EUROPE 1648–1815 47–48 (1973). 
 38. Id. at 47. 
 39. William S. Dodge, Breaking the Public Law Taboo, 43 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 161, 171 
(2002). 
 40. See ASHLEY, supra note 37, at 48 (noting that nations sought to protect their own 
industries and thereby increase national wealth by imposing subsidies on production and tariffs 
on imports). 
 41. See Dodge, supra note 39, at 171. 
 42. 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734) (Lord Harwicke, C.J.). 
 43. See id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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defense.46  Because the contract was illegal according to Portuguese law, the 
carrier argued, the carrier’s performance should be excused.47  The court in 
Boucher refused to recognize the Portuguese law and ultimately held that the 
contract was enforceable.48  As Lord Mansfield, the author of the court’s 
opinion, later put it: “[N]o country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of 
another.”49  This early application of the revenue rule was justified by 
commercial concerns.50  Foreign law that threatened to chill English trade was 
plainly disfavored in Mansfield’s court.  As Boucher made clear, enforcing 
oppressive duties or restrictions would have the effect of “cut[ting] off all 
benefit of such trade from th[e] kingdom, which would be of very bad 
consequence[s] to the principal and most beneficial branches of . . . trade.”51 
The early commercial justification of the revenue rule was roundly 
criticized.  Early commentators found Mansfield’s commercial concerns 
unprincipled and unimportant.52  Justice Joseph Story, for example, described 
this reasoning as “inconsistent with good faith and moral duties of nations.”53  
Later criticism has focused on the fact that the revenue rule was mere dicta in 
Boucher and Holman.54  In Boucher, for instance, because the Portuguese ban 
was not a revenue law per se, it has been pointed out that the revenue rule’s 
prohibition on enforcement of foreign revenue law is not essential to decide the 
case on its merits.55  Criticism notwithstanding, Mansfield’s decisions are 
generally considered the genesis of the revenue rule.56 
 
 46. Id. at 54. 
 47. Boucher, 95 Eng. Rep. at 54. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775).  Holman involved another 
contract dispute.  A French merchant had contracted to sell tea in France to an English merchant 
who planned to smuggle the tea into England without paying English duties.  Id.  When the 
French merchant sued for payment, the English merchant argued that the contract was void 
because it violated English tax laws.  Id.  The court held that the contract was enforceable.  Id.  
The English law defense was unavailing because the contract was governed by French law and 
French law did not recognize English tax law.  Id. 
 50. See Dodge, supra note 39, at 170–71. 
 51. Boucher, 95 Eng. Rep. at 54. 
 52. See, e.g., JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 338–39 (8th ed. 
1883) (1834). 
 53. Id. at 339. 
 54. See British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164 (9th Cir. 1979); William J. 
Kovatch, Jr., Recognizing Foreign Tax Judgments: An Argument for the Revocation of the 
Revenue Rule, 22 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 265, 274–76 (Winter 2000). 
 55. See European Community v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 150 F.Supp.2d 456, 478–79 (E.D.N.Y. 
2001). 
 56. See, e.g., Dodge, supra note 39, at 170. 
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B. Judge Learned Hand’s Risk-of-Embarrassment Justification 
The early revenue rule decisions in the United States applied the doctrine 
on the basis that the judiciary might embarrass the political branches of 
domestic and foreign governments by evaluating the tax laws of the foreign 
government.  Tax laws, like penal laws, are examples of positive law.57  
Positive law is “a system of law promulgated and implemented within a 
particular political community by political superiors.”58  Tax laws are said to 
“mirror the moral and social sensibilities of a society.”59  Therefore, the courts 
determined that the judicial evaluation of tax laws would risk embarrassment 
of domestic or foreign policy-makers, especially where domestic policy 
differed measurably from foreign policy.60 
The revenue rule was first applied in the context of enforcing tax 
judgments of sister states.  For example, a claim by the State of Colorado to 
collect a transfer tax in a New York state court was ruled impermissible as a 
matter outside the court’s jurisdiction.61  Colorado’s claim violated the “well-
settled principle of private international law which precludes one state from 
acting as a collector of taxes for a sister state and from enforcing its penal or 
revenue laws as such.”62  In a later opinion for the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals, Judge Learned Hand provided a detailed explanation of the basis for 
the revenue rule’s application in these cases.63  In assessing a claim brought 
under another state’s penal or revenue laws, the domestic court must 
necessarily assess the validity of that law.64  According to Judge Hand: 
This is not a troublesome or delicate inquiry . . . when it concerns the relations 
between the foreign state and its own citizens or even those who may be tem 
 
 57. See United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996); Roger Fisher, Bringing Law 
to Bear on Governments, 74 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1133 (1961). 
 58. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 925 (7th ed. 1999). 
 59. Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 111 (2d 
Cir. 2001). 
 60. See Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 277 (1935).  For example, 
suppose a foreign government imposed “a tax designed to render it very expensive to sell United 
States newspapers in that nation[.]”  Att’y Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 113.  A court evaluating 
the validity of such a law would face a clear dilemma between the conflicting policies of the U.S. 
Government and the particular foreign government.  Id. at 112.  The risk of embarrassment is 
therefore credible in such a situation.  Id. 
 61. Colorado v. Harbeck, 133 N.E. 357 (N.Y. 1921). 
 62. Id. at 360; see also Maryland v. Turner, 132 N.Y.S. 173, 175–76 (Sup. Ct. 1911); Detroit 
v. Proctor, 61 A.2d 412, 415 (Super. Ct. 1948); Arkansas v. Bowen, 20 D.C. 291, 295–96 (Sup. 
Ct. 1891); In re Bliss’ Estate, 202 N.Y.S. Supp. 185, 187 (N.Y. Sur. 1923).  But cf. Henry v. 
Sargeant, 13 N.H. 321 (1843) (asserting that New Hampshire state court has jurisdiction over a 
claim for Vermont taxes). 
 63. Moore v. Mitchell, 30 F.2d 600, 603–04 (Hand, J., concurring). 
 64. Id. at 604. 
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porarily within its borders.  To pass upon the provisions of the public order of 
another state is, or at any rate should be, beyond the powers of a court; it 
involves the relations between the states themselves, with which courts are 
incompetent to deal, and which are intrusted to other authorities.  It may 
commit the domestic state to a position which would seriously embarrass its 
neighbor.65 
Thus, by preventing one state from assessing the policy of another state, the 
revenue rule was thought to preserve relations among the states. 
Judge Hand’s opinion, drafted in 1929, was likely founded on a respect for 
state sovereignty.  At that time, state borders were considerably more opaque 
than they are today.66  Preserving state sovereignty was a particularly 
important concern for many in the aftermath of the Civil War.67  Judicial 
opinions from the era suggest the courts attempted to preserve this sovereignty 
in the face of a unifying national economy.68  In this context, there was a 
credible risk of embarrassment when the courts of one state evaluated the 
positive laws of another state.69 
Within a decade of Judge Hand’s opinion, however, the Supreme Court 
began to reassess the balance between the principles of state sovereignty and 
comity.70  The Court effectively reduced the scope of the revenue rule in the 
context of tax judgments between the states in Milwaukee County v. M.E. 
White Co.71  The Court held that the Full Faith and Credit Clause72 required 
states to recognize the tax laws of other states.73  The Court doubted that the 
policies of one state would differ dramatically from the policies of another 
state.74  Therefore, there was little risk that one state court’s decision would 
embarrass the policy-makers of another state.75  Despite the reduction of the 
 
 65. Id. 
 66. See Steven G. Gey, The Myth of State Sovereignty, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 1601, 1605 (2002). 
 67. See id. at 1606. 
 68. See, e.g., Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 273 (1918). 
 69. For example, consider that this was the beginning of an era in which state sovereignty 
was exemplified by Southern states’ expressed vehemence towards federal attempts to eradicate 
Jim Crow laws.  See Gey, supra note 66, at 1606. 
 70. See, e.g., H. Geoffrey Moulton, Jr., The Quixotic Search for a Judicially Enforceable 
Federalism, 83 MINN. L. REV. 849, 855 (“The question for the Court had become not whether 
Congress had impinged on state sovereignty, but only whether congressional action was within 
the scope of federal power.”). 
 71. 296 U.S. 268 (1935). 
 72. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 1 (“[F]ull Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the 
public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.”). 
 73. Milwaukee County, 296 U.S. at 276. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
The very purpose of the full-faith and credit clause was to alter the status of the several 
states as independent foreign sovereignties, each free to ignore obligations created under 
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doctrine in the context of sister state tax judgments, however, the revenue rule 
could not be totally abandoned.  A foreign sovereign could not rely on the 
constitutional argument to enforce a foreign tax judgment in a U.S. court 
because “there is no provision similar to the full faith and credit clause in the 
Constitution which would require that the courts of this country extend full 
faith and credit to the judgments of a foreign country.”76 
These early decisions suggest the revenue rule is an elastic doctrine that 
can be stretched or constricted in accordance with contemporary policy 
preferences.  Lord Mansfield recognized that English trade in the eighteenth 
century would benefit from prudent application of the revenue rule.77  
Similarly, the policy and constitutional arguments employed in the revenue 
rule cases in the United States in the 1920s and 1930s embody the then-
contemporary notion of the opacity of state borders. 
II.  CONTEMPORARY JUSTIFICATIONS 
Judge Hand’s risk-of-embarrassment justification for the revenue rule was 
eventually restated as three distinct but related justifications.  They are: (1) the 
principal concern that enforcement of foreign tax law violates separation of 
powers; (2) the concern that use of domestic courts for foreign tax issues 
offends our sense of national sovereignty; and (3) the concern that domestic 
courts are not competent to interpret foreign tax law issues.78  This section will 
examine each of these justifications in turn. 
A. Separation of Powers Concerns 
The separation of powers principle is fundamental to the Constitution’s 
framework.79  The Constitution delegates several duties with respect to foreign  
 
the laws or by the judicial proceedings of the others, and to make them integral parts of a 
single nation throughout which a remedy upon a just obligation might be demanded as of 
right, irrespective of the state of origin. 
Id. at 276–77. 
 76. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1164–65 n.8 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 77. Boucher v. Lawson, 95 Eng. Rep. 53 (K.B. 1734) (Lord Harwicke, C.J.). 
 78. Bradley R. Wilson, Subtle Indiscretions? International Smuggling, Federal Criminal 
Law, and the Revenue Rule, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 231, 240 (Nov. 2003); see also Pasquantino v. 
United States, 544 U.S. 349, 370 (2005). 
 79. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (“The Constitution enumerates and 
separates the powers of the three branches of Government in Articles I, II, and III, and it is this 
‘very structure’ of the Constitution that exemplifies the concept of separation of powers.”) 
(quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 946 (1983)). 
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affairs exclusively to the executive branch.80  These duties include the power to 
make treaties and the power to appoint ambassadors.81  These duties are 
thought to be vested in the executive so that the government may present a 
unified face to the international community.82  Additionally, as a singular 
entity, the executive is thought to be better able to respond to international 
events demanding quick and efficient action than a legislative or judicial 
body.83  Because foreign policy matters are delegated to the executive branch, 
the judiciary is barred by the separation of powers principle from deciding 
cases involving a large measure of foreign policy.84 
In the revenue rule context, courts have concluded that separation of 
powers concerns are present where a claim involves direct enforcement of a 
foreign tax law and the executive branch has no involvement in the case.85  
United States v. Boots86 is an example of a revenue rule case that was decided 
largely on separation of powers grounds.87  The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
held that the revenue rule barred the federal wire fraud prosecution of U.S. 
citizens charged with violating foreign tax laws.88  The court was particularly 
concerned with the risk that “[n]ational policy judgments” might be 
“undermined” if the court were to give general effect to the foreign tax laws at 
issue in the prosecution.89 
 
 80. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2; United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 
(1936) (“[T]he President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation.”). 
 81. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1–2. 
 82. See Curtiss-Wright Export, 299 U.S. at 320 (stressing the “very delicate, plenary and 
exclusive power of the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations”).  Compare Curtis A. Bradley & Martin S. Flaherty, Executive Power 
Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545, 579–80 (2004) (arguing that Executive 
power did not originally include plenary foreign affairs duties), with Saikrishna B. Prakash & 
Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. 
REV. 1591, 1685 (2005) (explaining that foreign affairs duties were assigned to the Executive for 
the simple reason that the prevalent understanding in the eighteenth century of the Executive 
power included these duties). 
 83. See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“The 
Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along with the necessary 
power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign relations.  They did so 
principally because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are essential in these 
domains.”). 
 84. See Chicago & Southern Air Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 
(1948) (“[T]he very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is political, not judicial.”). 
 85. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
 86. 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 87. Id. 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. at 588. 
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Other courts have held, however, that direct executive branch involvement 
in the case will diminish separation of powers concerns.  The Executive is 
directly involved in a case, for example, where the federal government 
prosecutes a defendant under a domestic statute.90  The federal prosecutor is 
after all considered an organ of the executive branch.91  According to the 
Supreme Court, “by electing to bring [a] prosecution, the Executive has 
assessed the prosecution’s impact on” foreign policy and has “concluded that it 
poses little danger of causing international friction.”92  Hence, contrary to 
Boots, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that a wire fraud 
prosecution based on violations of foreign tax law did not implicate separation 
of powers concerns because the Congress and the Executive were directly 
involved in the case.93  The court noted, “Congress enacted the wire fraud 
statute and the United States Attorney, acting on behalf of the United States as 
directed by the Executive Branch, made the decision to seek the Defendants’ 
indictment thereunder.”94  In fact, according to the court, “a significant 
separation of powers problem would arise were [the court] to play diplomat 
from the bench by relying on a novel expansion of the common law revenue 
rule, no doubt a policy laden rule,” to bar the government’s wire fraud 
prosecution.95  The court further reasoned that even if the prosecution involves 
some degree of interpretation of foreign tax law, the enforcement of a domestic 
statute should be characterized as the vindication of a domestic law 
enforcement interest rather than as the enforcement of a foreign tax law.96 
Although the separation of powers principle is central to the constitutional 
framework, the branches of government are not definitively 
compartmentalized.97  There exists a permissible measure of overlap among 
the separate branches.98  For example, the Executive may employ the treaty 
power as a mechanism to authorize another branch of government to perform a 
 
 90. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 364 (2005). 
 91. Id. at 369. 
 92. Id. 
 93. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 331 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 330–31. 
 97. See Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 341 (2000) (noting that the “boundaries between the 
three branches are not ‘“hermetically” sealed’”) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 
(1983)); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 388 (1989) (“[C]onsistent with the separation 
of powers, Congress may delegate to the Judicial Branch nonadjudicatory functions that do not 
trench upon the prerogatives of another Branch and that are appropriate to the central mission of 
the Judiciary.”). 
 98. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 380. 
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duty that impacts foreign policy.99  Therefore, courts have acknowledged the 
absence of separation of powers concerns where the United States has entered 
into a treaty that calls for the enforcement of foreign tax judgments.100  In 
Gilbertson, the Canadian Province of British Columbia sued in United States 
federal district court to recover on a judgment for tax revenue originally 
awarded by a Canadian court.101  In holding that the revenue rule barred the 
claim, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that Canada and the United 
States were parties to two extensive tax treaties.102  The treaties each provided 
that the governments will exchange information when needed in order to 
curtail international tax evasion.103  However, the treaties did not provide for 
reciprocal enforcement powers.104  The court noted, “[e]ven though the 
political branches of the two countries could have abolished the revenue rule 
between themselves at the time they entered into the treaties, they did not.”105  
Therefore, without evidence of executive or legislative consent, enforcement of 
a foreign tax judgment would implicate the separation of powers concerns of 
the revenue rule.106 
In sum, in the absence of evidence of consent from the political branches 
of government, enforcement of a foreign tax judgment would implicate the 
separation of powers concerns of the revenue rule.  Evidence of sufficient 
consent has been found where the executive branch is involved directly in the 
case by prosecuting a U.S. citizen under a domestic statute. 107  Evidence of 
sufficient consent will also probably be found where the claim or prosecution 
is brought under the terms of a valid treaty.108 
 
 99. See, e.g., United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 201 (2004) (“[T]reaties made pursuant to 
[the treaty] power can authorize Congress to deal with ‘matters’ with which otherwise ‘Congress 
could not deal.’”) (quoting Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920)). 
 100. See Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 116 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
 101. British Columbia v. Gilbertson, 597 F.2d 1161, 1162 (9th Cir. 1979). 
 102. Id. at 1165–66. 
 103. Id. at 1165. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. See also Republic of Honduras v. Philip Morris Cos., Inc., 341 F.3d 1253, 1259 (11th 
Cir. 2003) (holding that the revenue rule barred the Republic’s suit to recover tax revenue 
because “[t]he political branches undisputedly have not entered into any type of tax treaty with 
any of the Republics that would allow the Republics to enforce their tax claims underlying this 
suit in this country.”); Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 
103, 119–22 (2d Cir. 2001) (discussing at length the U.S.–Canada Treaty Framework). 
 107. European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175, 180–81 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 108. See Gilbertson, 597 F.2d at 1162–65. 
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B. National Sovereignty Concerns 
The revenue rule is also occasionally justified by a respect for national 
sovereignty.109  That is, “the rule prevents sovereigns from asserting their 
sovereignty within the borders of other nations, thereby helping nations 
maintain their mutual respect and security.”110  The national sovereignty 
justification is as old as the revenue rule itself.  The respect for national 
sovereignty can be gleaned from Lord Mansfield’s earliest enunciations of the 
revenue rule: “[N]o country ever takes notice of the revenue laws of 
another.”111 
In holding that the revenue rule barred foreign governments from bringing 
a civil RICO claim based on foreign tax evasion, the court in Attorney General 
of Canada reasoned that the suit would allow for the extraterritorial application 
of foreign tax law.112  According to the court: 
[T]he class of laws which will be enforced are those laws which are an 
exercise by the sovereign government of its sovereign authority over property 
within its territory or over its subjects wherever they may be.  But other laws 
will not be enforced.  By international law every sovereign state has no 
sovereignty beyond its own frontiers.  The courts of other countries will not 
allow it to go beyond the bounds.  They will not enforce any of its laws which 
purport to exercise sovereignty beyond the limits of its authority.113 
According to this formulation, the court’s responsibilities include protecting 
domestic sovereignty against the assault of an extraterritorial application of 
foreign tax law.114 
C. Judicial Competence 
A final, less common justification given for the revenue rule is that U.S. 
courts lack competence to interpret foreign tax law issues.  Competence to 
interpret foreign tax law issues involves the pragmatic consideration of the 
complexity of the law at issue.  Judicial competence concerns arise in cases 
involving foreign tax law because one party will necessarily argue that the 
foreign tax law was not violated, that the foreign tax law does not apply to the 
case at hand, or that the foreign tax law is invalid.115  Any of these arguments 
will require the domestic court to “effectively pass[ ] on the validity and 
 
 109. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 111–12. 
 110. Id. at 111; see also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 448 (1964) 
(White, J., dissenting on other grounds). 
 111. Holman v. Johnson, 98 Eng. Rep. 1120, 1121 (K.B. 1775). 
 112. Att’y Gen. of Canada, 268 F.3d at 106. 
 113. Id. at 111 n.6 (quoting Att’y Gen. of N.Z. v. Ortiz, [1984] A.C. 1 (H.L.)). 
 114. See id. at 112 (“[W]e will not permit the presence in our country of foreign tax men, 
even if represented by intermediaries; we do not tolerate that any help may be given to them”) 
(quoting QRS 1 APS v. Frandsen, [1999] 3 All E.R. 289, 294–97 (C.A. 1999)). 
 115. Wilson, supra note 78, at 256. 
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operation of the revenue laws of a foreign country, [thereby implicating] the 
important concerns underlying the revenue rule.”116 
Domestic judges are not trained to interpret foreign tax law.  It might be 
said, domestic judges are “naïve as to the laws of other nations.”117  Regarding 
the difficulty of interpreting foreign tax laws, it has been noted: 
[T]here is the difficulty of applying foreign tax law correctly.  A mature tax 
system is likely to be a very intricate network of rules, regulations, and 
accounting practices administered by a special bureaucracy under judicial 
supervision by a separate tax court hierarchy, aided by a specialized tax bar 
and accounting profession.  The even-handed application of such a body of law 
by a foreign court of general jurisdiction is, to say the last, not easy.118 
This argument is bolstered when one considers the complexity of our own 
Internal Revenue Code.119  It has also been pointed out that the difficulty of 
discovery of evidence in a complicated tax claim will be compounded by the 
fact that the events at issue occurred in a foreign country, far from where the 
trial is held.120  The judicial competence justification therefore implies that a 
domestic court should refuse to preside over a foreign tax claim involving 
complex foreign tax issues in fairness to the litigants in a particular case. 
III.  PASQUANTINO: A NARROW READING OF THE REVENUE RULE 
The contemporary justifications were examined and applied in the 
Supreme Court’s most recent revenue rule decision.  In Pasquantino, the 
Supreme Court resolved a circuit split that had developed over the question 
whether the revenue rule bars a federal wire fraud prosecution based on foreign 
tax evasion.121  Pasquantino therefore provides the framework for resolving 
“mixed” questions of law involving a domestic statute and a foreign tax law.122  
In a 5–4 majority decision penned by Justice Thomas, the Court held that the 
revenue rule did not bar a federal wire fraud prosecution because such a 
prosecution only incidentally recognizes a foreign tax law while directly 
enforcing a domestic statute.123 
 
 116. United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580, 587 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 117. Wilson, supra note 78, at 240. 
 118. Hans W. Baade, The Operation of Foreign Public Law, 30 TEX. INT’L L.J. 429, 483 
(1995). 
 119. See, e.g., Alexander v. Everson, Slip Copy, 2005 WL 2035041 (D. Kan. Apr. 23, 2004) 
(noting the complexities of the Internal Revenue Code in refusing to impose sanctions on a pro se 
litigant in a tax related claim). 
 120. Dodge, supra note 39, at 209–10. 
 121. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 354 (2005). 
 122. See id.  Pasquantino also represents the Court’s latest revenue rule decision.  The 
revenue rule was last essential to the holding of a Supreme Court decision in 1935 in Milwaukee 
County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935). 
 123. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 354–55. 
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Pasquantino involved a federal prosecution under the federal wire fraud 
statute.124  The federal wire fraud statute criminalizes the interstate use of 
wires, radio, or television communications for the purposes of executing any 
scheme or artifice to defraud.125  The phrase “scheme to defraud” is broadly 
construed.126  For example, each telephone or radio communication constitutes 
a separate offense under the wire fraud statute even though all of the 
communications together are part of a single fraudulent scheme.127 
The government charged the Pasquantinos and an accomplice, Arthur 
Hilts, with wire fraud for their participation in a scheme to smuggle liquor into 
Canada without paying Canadian excise taxes.128  According to the 
prosecution, the Pasquantinos had placed several phone calls from their homes 
in New York to liquor retailers located in Maryland.129  Hilts and other drivers 
were then employed to transport the liquor across the Canadian border while 
concealing the contents of each shipment from Canadian customs officials.130  
Following their arrest, the Pasquantinos and Hilts were charged with and 
eventually convicted of several federal wire fraud statute violations.131  The 
defendants argued on appeal that the revenue rule barred the prosecution 
because the case required the court to interpret Canadian tax law.132  The 
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction on the basis that the 
revenue rule did not apply because the prosecution amounted to the direct 
enforcement of a domestic statute.133 
The First and Second Circuit Courts of Appeals had split over the question 
of whether the revenue rule applied to a prosecution like the one in 
Pasquantino.134  On similar facts,135 the First Circuit Court of Appeals in Boots 
 
 124. Id. at 353; 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2000). 
 125. § 1343. 
 126. See Ellen M. Faro, Note, Telemarketing Credit Card Fraud: Is RICO One Answer?, 
1990 U. ILL. L. REV. 675, 694 n.195 (1990) (explaining that the broad construction of the wire 
fraud statute prevailed in the nineteenth century based on the notions that “use of the mails was a 
privilege available only to the ‘most high-minded’” and the purpose of the statute was to prevent 
the perversion of the Nation’s mail and wire systems). 
 127. See, e.g., United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 914 (8th Cir. 1975) (noting that each 
use of the wires is a separate offense under the wire fraud statute even though all may be part of a 
single fraudulent scheme). 
 128. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 353. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 354. 
 133. United States v. Pasquantino, 336 F.3d 321, 327–31 (4th Cir. 2003). 
 134. Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 354 (2005); see United States v. Trapilo, 
130 F.3d 547 (2d Cir. 1997); United States v. Boots, 80 F.3d 580 (1st Cir. 1996). 
 135. Boots involved a federal wire fraud prosecution for a scheme to smuggle cigarettes 
across the Canadian border using a Native American reservation that straddled the border as a 
conduit.  Boots, 80 F.3d at 583. 
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held that the revenue rule barred the government from prosecuting the 
defendants.136  Because the prosecution required the court to take cognizance 
of Canadian tax law, the Boots court was concerned that the case would allow 
the judiciary to interfere and undermine “the legislative and executive 
branches’ exercise of their foreign policymaking powers.”137  The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Trapilo concluded to the contrary, holding that the 
revenue rule did not bar such prosecutions.138  According to the Trapilo court, 
these wire fraud prosecutions did not implicate separation of powers concerns 
at all.139  No interpretation of foreign tax law was required.140  Rather, 
according to Trapilo, the Government’s prosecution only required the court to 
determine whether the federal wire fraud statute was violated, that is, whether 
the defendants possessed the intent to defraud the Canadian government of tax 
revenue.141 
In resolving the split, the Court sided with the Trapilo conclusion that the 
revenue rule did not bar federal wire fraud prosecutions of a scheme to evade 
foreign taxes.142  Central to the Court’s holding was the characterization of the 
wire fraud prosecution as the direct enforcement of a domestic statute.143  The 
defendants had argued that the collection of Canadian taxes was the primary 
object of the prosecution because the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 
1996144 requires an award of restitution of lost tax revenue to the Canadian 
government.145  The Court reasoned, however, that “the wire fraud statute 
advances the Federal Government’s independent interest in punishing 
fraudulent domestic criminal conduct,” viz., fraudulent use of interstate 
wires.146  Though requiring the Court to incidentally recognize foreign tax law, 
 
 136. Id. at 588-89. 
 137. Id. at 587–88. 
 138. Trapilo, 130 F.3d at 549.  Trapilo involved a federal wire fraud prosecution for a scheme 
nearly identical to the one in Boots: the defendants manufactured a scheme in which liquor and 
cigarettes would be smuggled across the Canadian border through another Native American 
reservation straddling the Canadian border.  Id. 
 139. Id. at 552–53. 
 140. Id. 
 141. Id. at 552. 
 142. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 354–53 (2005).  Justice Ginsburg’s 
dissenting opinion, joined by three other Justices, argued that the revenue rule applied because the 
prosecution primarily amounted to the direct enforcement of foreign tax law.  Id. at 372, 376–77 
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting).  Ginsburg focused on the fact that under prevailing sentencing 
guidelines the defendants’ sentences were to be determined by a calculation of the damage 
inflicted by the wire fraud scheme, that is, by a calculation of the amount of foreign tax revenue 
lost to the scheme.  Id. 
 143. See id. at 362. 
 144. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A–64 (2000). 
 145. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 364. 
 146. Id. at 365. 
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the case ultimately involved “a domestic sovereign acting pursuant to authority 
conferred by a criminal statute.”147 
The Court concluded that the justifications for the revenue rule were not 
triggered by federal wire fraud prosecutions of schemes to evade foreign 
taxes.148  Separation of powers concerns were not implicated by the 
prosecution because the political branches were involved in the case.149  
According to the Court’s characterization of the prosecution: “This action was 
brought by the Executive to enforce a statute passed by Congress.”150  Nothing 
in the wire fraud statute or the statute’s legislative history suggests that 
Congress intended to exempt these sorts of cases from wire fraud 
prosecutions.151  Furthermore, because this case was brought by the federal 
government, it could be assumed that the executive branch “has assessed this 
prosecution’s impact on this Nation’s relationship with Canada, and concluded 
that it poses little danger of causing international friction.”152 
National sovereignty concerns were not implicated because the prosecution 
did not involve the extraterritorial enforcement of foreign tax law.153  The 
prosecution primarily amounted to the direct enforcement of a domestic 
criminal statute which merely recognized a foreign tax law.154  The prosecution 
represents the “policy choice of the two political branches of our 
Government—Congress and the Executive—to free the interstate wires from 
fraudulent use, irrespective of the object of the fraud.”155  The Court expressed 
mild bewilderment as to why the Government might wish to divert resources to 
prosecute a scheme in which another government was the victim.156  
Nevertheless, the Court was convinced that the prosecution’s primary objective 
was the vindication of domestic law enforcement interests.157 
Finally, judicial competence concerns were not implicated because the 
case raised no complicated foreign tax issues.158  The case focused on the 
question of whether the Pasquantinos possessed the intent to violate foreign tax 
law, not on whether the foreign tax law was actually violated.159  The question 
of whether the scheme would indeed violate foreign tax law was resolved by 
 
 147. Id. at 364. 
 148. Id. at 368. 
 149. Id. at 369. 
 150. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 369. 
 151. Id. at 354–60. 
 152. Id. at 369. 
 153. Id. at 371. 
 154. Id. 
 155. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 370. 
 156. Id. at 372. 
 157. See id. at 371–72. 
 158. Id. at 370. 
 159. See id. 
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the presentation of the testimony of a government witness.160  A provision of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure161 provides that a court may consider 
such testimony in interpreting matters of foreign law.162 
The Pasquantino decision therefore adopted the Trapilo court’s narrow 
reading of the revenue rule in wire fraud cases.  In cases where the political 
branches are directly involved, foreign policy-related concerns are absent and 
the revenue rule will not apply.  The Court’s decision also makes clear the 
importance of characterization in the revenue rule analysis, especially in those 
cases involving equal parts domestic and foreign law.  Thus, the revenue rule 
will not apply where, as in Pasquantino, the prosecution or claim primarily 
vindicates domestic interests, even though such a prosecution or claim 
incidentally furthers foreign interests. 
IV.  CIVIL RICO AND THE REVENUE RULE IN THE SECOND CIRCUIT 
In a footnote, the Pasquantino Court expressly refused to decide “whether 
a foreign government, based on wire or mail fraud predicate offenses, may 
bring a civil action under [RICO] for a scheme to defraud it of taxes.”163  
Foreign governments had already attempted to sue cigarette-makers under the 
civil provisions of RICO alleging foreign tax evasion.164  In Attorney General 
of Canada and European Community I, each decided prior to Pasquantino, the 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals had held that the revenue rule bars such 
claims.165  The Supreme Court vacated and remanded166 European Community 
I to the Second Circuit for “reconsideration in light of its decision in 
Pasquantino.”167  After providing an overview of civil RICO, this section 
outlines the reasoning of the Second Circuit’s revenue rule analyses in 
Attorney General of Canada, European Community I, and European 
Community II. 
 
 160. See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 370. 
 161. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.1. 
 162. See id.; Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 370. 
 163. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 355 n.1. 
 164. See, e.g., Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103 
(2d Cir. 2001). 
 165. See id. at 134–35; European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. (European Cmty. I), 355 F.3d 
123, 139 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 166. European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 544 U.S. 1012 (2005). 
 167. European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc. (European Cmty. II), 424 F.3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 
2005). 
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A. Civil RICO 
RICO was originally enacted for the purpose of combating organized 
crime.168  The elements of a RICO offense are: (1) the commission of a 
predicate act; (2) direct or indirect involvement in an enterprise; and (3) the 
enterprise affects interstate or foreign commerce.169  A wire fraud offense is an 
example of a RICO “predicate act.”170  Like the federal wire fraud statute, the 
provisions of RICO are broadly construed to encompass a wide range of 
conduct.171  Congress expressly provided that “[t]he provisions of [RICO] shall 
be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.”172  Thus, in Sedima, 
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex, the Court rejected attempts to restrict the reach of civil RICO 
by holding that a defendant need not be prosecuted by the government and 
convicted of a predicate act before a plaintiff can bring a civil RICO claim.173 
 
 168. Michele Sacks et al., Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations, 42 AM. CRIM. L. 
REV. 825, 826 (2005). 
 169. Id. at 828. 
 170. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (2000); see, e.g., Bank of China, N.Y. Branch v. NBM LLC, 125 
S.Ct. 2956 (2005). 
 171. Compare Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 526 (1985) (Powell, J., 
dissenting) (“RICO has been interpreted so broadly that it has been used more often against 
respected businesses with no ties to organized crime, than against the mobsters who were the 
clearly intended target of the statute.”), with La. Power and Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line 
Co., 642 F.Supp. 781, 802 (E.D. La. 1986) (“[T]he crimes of mail and wire fraud are broad in 
scope, and the interpretation given them must be flexible enough to encompass any conduct 
falling below the mark of fair play and right dealing.”).  James P. Kennedy notes: 
[The] broad statutory language coupled with the lure of treble damages and attorneys’ 
fees, has made civil RICO actions very attractive to plaintiffs in a myriad of commercial 
litigation cases. . . . Included within [the] predicate acts [for a RICO claim or prosecution] 
are mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and wire fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1343), the broadest 
criminal statutes in the federal code. 
James P. Kennedy, Civil RICO in the Antitrust Context, 55 ANTITRUST 463, 463–65 (1986).  See 
also Daniel Z. Herbst, Comment, Injunctive Relief and Civil RICO: After Scheidler v. National 
Organization for Women, Inc., RICO’s Scope and Remedies Require Reevaluation, 53 CATH. U. 
L. REV. 1125, 1125–26 (2004) (describing the explosion of civil RICO litigation in the 1980s, due 
in part to a broad construction of the civil RICO provisions along with an equally broad 
construction of the predicate wire fraud activity provisions); Jerry J. Phillips, Thinking, 72 TENN. 
L. REV. 697, 726 (2005) (“Many feel that Congress cast the net of civil RICO much more broadly 
than intended or desirable, snaring bankers and lawyers and accountants as well as the Mafia—
especially under the mail and wire fraud predicate acts.”). 
 172. Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 
Stat. 941, 947 (1970); see Bankers Trust Co. v. Rhoades, 859 F.2d 1096, 1100–01 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(deferring to congressional instructions to liberally construe the civil RICO provisions and 
holding that lower court erred when it applied an additional standing requirement to the plaintiffs’ 
claim). 
 173. Sedima, 473 U.S. at 524; see also Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs., Inc., 
483 U.S. 143, 149–50 (1987) (identifying numerous offenses that qualify as “racketeering 
activity” within the meaning of RICO). 
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RICO provides a private cause of action to parties injured by conduct 
amounting to a violation of the statute.174  “To establish a [civil] RICO claim, a 
plaintiff must show: ‘(1) a violation of the RICO statute . . . ; (2) an injury to 
business or property; and (3) that the injury was caused by the violation of 
[RICO].”175  A plaintiff who prevails on a civil RICO claim is entitled to treble 
damages, filing costs, and attorney’s fees.176  RICO violations often involve 
complex schemes that test the limits of law enforcement capabilities and 
resources.177  Consequently, one purpose of RICO’s civil enforcement scheme 
has been to provide much-needed assistance to federal and state law 
enforcement agencies.178 
Few law enforcement provisions were left untouched by the legislation 
enacted in response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and RICO is 
no exception.  RICO was amended to include terrorism-related offenses and 
predicate acts by the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing 
Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 
(the Patriot Act).179  RICO predicate acts now include money laundering 
crimes against foreign nations and financial schemes that might aid terrorist 
groups.180 
By expanding the already broad reach of civil RICO, it has been posited 
that Congress intended to further reduce the scope of the revenue rule.181  
Specifically, it has been argued that Congress intended to reduce the scope of 
the revenue rule in cases brought by foreign governments under civil RICO 
against U.S. cigarette-makers for foreign tax evasion.182  The proponents of 
this argument point to the legislative history of the Patriot Act amendment.183  
First, the original version of the Patriot Act amendment to RICO included a 
“rule of construction,” a provision pertaining to civil RICO claims and foreign 
tax laws.184  According to that original version: 
None of the changes or amendments made by the Financial Anti-Terrorism Act 
of 2001 shall expand the jurisdiction of any Federal or State court over any 
civil action or claim for monetary damages for the nonpayment of taxes or 
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duties under the revenue laws of a foreign state, or any political subdivision 
thereof, except as such actions or claims are authorized by [a] United States 
treaty that provides the United States and its political subdivisions with 
reciprocal rights to pursue such actions or claims in the courts of the foreign 
state and its political subdivisions.185 
This provision, which would have clearly exempted cigarette-makers from 
foreign tax claims brought by most foreign governments, was conspicuously 
deleted from the final version of the Patriot Act.186  Second, it has been argued 
that the section-by-section analyses of the Patriot Act and accompanying 
legislators’ comments indicate that the deletion effectively exposed U.S. 
cigarette-makers to potential liability under the civil RICO provisions.187  For 
example, the section-by-section analyses presented to and approved by both 
Houses of Congress expressly note that the deletion “dropped [the exemption 
for] tobacco companies from RICO liability for foreign excise taxes.”188 
B. Attorney General of Canada 
The Second Circuit’s first civil RICO case involving the revenue rule 
concerned a suit brought by the Attorney General of Canada against cigarette 
maker R.J. Reynolds and several of its North American subsidiaries.189  
Canada’s suit alleged that the defendants had engaged in a complicated scheme 
to avoid the Canadian import tax on cigarettes.190  In perpetrating the 
smuggling scheme, the defendants had employed the U.S. mails and wires in 
various transactions.191  Therefore, the defendants had committed the RICO 
predicate act of wire fraud.192  Canada brought suit against the defendants 
under the civil enforcement provisions of RICO alleging a conspiracy to 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 134. 
 187. See 147 Cong. Rec. 15, 20872 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 2001) (statement of Rep. Wexler) (“I 
am pleased that a provision earlier included . . . which would have inhibited RICO liability for 
foreign excise taxes for tobacco companies, has been dropped from the USA PATRIOT Act.”); 
id. at 20710 (daily ed. Oct. 25, 2001) (statement of Sen. Kerry) (“[I]t is the intent of the 
legislature that our allies will have access to our courts and the use of our laws if they are the 
victims of smuggling, fraud, money laundering, or terrorism.”); 147 Cong. Rec. 14, 20447 (daily 
ed. Oct. 23, 2001) (statement of Rep. Conyers) (“I am very proud . . . [that] we dropped the 
administration proposal that would have . . . prevented RICO liability for tobacco companies.”). 
 188. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d at 134. 
 189. Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Holdings, Inc., 268 F.3d 103, 105–06 
(2d. Cir. 2001). 
 190. See id. at 105. 
 191. See id. at 107. 
 192. See id. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
224 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:203 
defraud the Canadian government of tax revenue.193  Canada sought restitution 
and law enforcement fees.194 
In Attorney General of Canada, the Second Circuit affirmed the lower 
court’s decision that the revenue rule barred Canada’s suit.195  The court 
characterized Canada’s civil RICO claim as a “request for extraterritorial tax 
enforcement by a foreign sovereign.”196  The court distinguished its own 
decision in Trapilo, where it had held that the revenue rule did not bar a federal 
wire fraud prosecution of a scheme to violate foreign tax law, by focusing on 
the identity of the plaintiff.197  “[T]here is a critical difference between this 
civil suit brought by a foreign sovereign and the criminal actions previously 
considered by [the court in Trapilo].”198  Because the executive branch brought 
the suit in Trapilo, the separation of powers concerns were absent.199  In 
Attorney General of Canada, however, the Executive was not involved in 
Canada’s civil RICO claim.200  Therefore, according to the court, the foreign 
policy-related justifications of the revenue rule, particularly the separation of 
powers concerns, were implicated by the civil RICO claim.201 
C. European Community I: Civil RICO, the Revenue Rule, and the Patriot 
Act 
The Second Circuit decided Attorney General of Canada before the Patriot 
Act amendments to RICO were enacted.  In European Community I, the 
Second Circuit considered another civil RICO claim brought by a foreign 
government against U.S. cigarette-makers.202  In holding that the revenue rule 
barred the foreign government’s suit, the court repeated much of its reasoning 
from Attorney General of Canada and rejected the argument that the Patriot 
Act’s legislative history invited foreign governments to bring civil RICO 
claims against cigarette-makers.203 
The European Community (E.C.) alleged that the cigarette-makers were 
involved in black market activities in E.C. territories designed to evade the 
taxes imposed by those governments on cigarettes.204  The E.C. imposes a 
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relatively high excise tax as a revenue-raising measure.205  In order to avoid 
these taxes, the cigarette-makers allegedly sold to distributors who openly 
admitted selling to smugglers who then illegally shipped the cigarettes into 
Europe.206  The cigarette-makers’ executives allegedly enjoyed part of the 
profits generated by these transactions in the form of bonuses and kickbacks.207  
As a result of such black market activities, the E.C. has estimated that its 
governments lose over one billion dollars in revenue per year.208  The E.C. 
therefore alleged that the cigarette-makers were involved in a smuggling 
scheme within the meaning of RICO and had committed the predicate act of 
wire fraud in furthering the conspiracy.209  The E.C. sought the civil RICO 
remedy of treble damages based on lost revenue and law enforcement costs.210 
On appeal, the Second Circuit concluded that the justifications for the 
revenue rule were implicated by the E.C.’s claim.211  The case presented 
separation of powers concerns because neither the executive nor the legislative 
branch of government was involved in the case.212  The E.C. argued that the 
executive branch’s consent was implied because that branch had not expressly 
opposed the suit.213  Mere “executive inaction,” however, was not enough to 
overcome the court’s separation of powers concerns.214  Neutrality, in the 
court’s opinion, did not amount to evidence of Executive consent.215  Instead, 
Executive consent is apparent, for example, where the government has 
“[brought] suit itself,” as in the wire fraud prosecution in Trapilo.216 
The court was also not persuaded by the argument that the legislative 
history of the Patriot Act evidenced Congressional intent to subject cigarette-
makers to civil RICO claims by foreign governments.217  First, according to the 
court, the Patriot Act amendments adding additional offenses to RICO in order 
to expand the statute’s reach to include terrorist-related activities did not 
indicate Congressional intent to do away with the revenue rule in civil RICO 
cases.218  The court refused to accept the proposition that the addition of a few 
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offenses to RICO changed the entire “structure or focus” of the statute.219  
Second, with respect to the deletion of the proposed rule of construction that 
would have exempted cigarette-makers from civil RICO claims, the court 
pointed out that the deleted provision was a proposed rule of construction for 
the Patriot Act and not a part of the legislative history of RICO.220  The court 
refused to interpret one statute in light of the legislative history of another 
statute.221  In any event, the court concluded that mere deletion of a provision 
does not suggest that Congress actually intended to overrule revenue rule case 
law and entirely abrogate the revenue rule in all cases.222  Finally, with respect 
to the statements of members of Congress who interpreted the deletion as 
abrogating the revenue rule in the civil RICO context, the court doubted that 
the views of only a handful of legislators represented clear evidence of 
Congressional intent to open federal courts to civil RICO claims like the one 
brought by the E.C.223 
The Second Circuit also suggested that the national sovereignty 
justification for the revenue rule was present because the claim would amount 
to extraterritorial enforcement of foreign tax law.224  Again echoing Attorney 
General of Canada, the court characterized the civil RICO claim as the direct 
enforcement of foreign tax law.225  The E.C.’s claim was premised exclusively 
on violations of foreign tax law.226  “[A]djudicating [the E.C’s claim] 
would . . . requir[e] the court to evaluate the policies behind the relevant 
foreign tax laws, interpret their provisions, and enforce them by awarding 
damages.”227  Therefore, according to the Second Circuit’s characterization of 
the claim, the sole object of the suit was to allow the E.C. to enforce its own 
tax laws through the mechanism of a civil RICO claim.228 
Beyond the Patriot Act amendments, nothing had changed between 
Attorney General of Canada and European Community I.  The facts of the 
cases were nearly identical and the court concluded that it was bound by the 
precedent established in Attorney General of Canada.229  The changes in civil 
RICO’s legislative history were not persuasive enough to pry the court from 
this precedent. 
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D. European Community II: Civil RICO and the Revenue Rule ‘In Light of 
Pasquantino’ 
The Supreme Court vacated and remanded the Second Circuit’s decision in 
European Community I for reconsideration in light of the Court’s revenue rule 
decision in Pasquantino.230  Upon remand, the Second Circuit in European 
Community II distinguished Pasquantino and reinstated its prior decision.231  
As in European Community I, the court concluded that the E.C.’s claim raised 
separation of powers and national sovereignty concerns.232 
According to the court, Pasquantino did not cast sufficient doubt on its 
prior decision in European Community I to warrant reversal.233  First, the wire 
fraud prosecution in Pasquantino did not raise the separation of powers 
concerns that were raised by the E.C.’s claim.234  The political branches were 
directly involved in the wire fraud prosecution in Pasquantino.235  “[C]oncerns 
about separation of powers [are] greatly diminished where the government 
brings a prosecution within the bounds of a statute created by Congress.”236  
On the other hand, executive branch involvement was not apparent in the 
E.C.’s civil RICO claim.237  The claim was brought by a foreign government, 
not by the Executive.238  Furthermore, the court repeated its assertion from 
European Community I that the Executive had not signaled express consent to 
the E.C.’s claim.239 
Second, according to the Second Circuit, the wire fraud prosecution in 
Pasquantino did not raise the national sovereignty concerns that were present 
in European Community II.240  Pasquantino involved a prosecution under the 
federal wire fraud statute.241  The “‘primary object’” of Pasquantino was the 
enforcement of a domestic statute.242  Foreign tax law was only enforced in an 
“attenuated sense.”243  By contrast, the substance of the E.C.’s claim was the 
collection of foreign revenue.244  According to the court, it was not enough that 
the use of the “private prosecutor” mechanism of RICO might further a 
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domestic law enforcement interest.245  The court’s reasoning on this point was 
succinct: “Whatever the merits of this argument, Pasquantino does not endorse 
it.”246 
V.  ANALYSIS OF THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S REVENUE RULE DECISIONS 
In Attorney General of Canada and European Community I and II, the 
Second Circuit adopted an unnecessarily expansive reading of the revenue rule.  
The court held that the E.C.’s claim implicated separation of powers and 
national sovereignty concerns.  As this section will show, however, these 
concerns were overstated.  The separation of powers concerns were diminished 
because the political branches have implicitly consented to civil RICO claims 
against cigarette-makers.  The national sovereignty concerns were also 
diminished because the claim could have been characterized as the direct 
enforcement of a domestic statute rather than the extraterritorial enforcement 
of a foreign tax law.  This section also addresses the likely isolationist impact 
of the Second Circuit’s decision to expand the scope of the revenue rule.  
Finally, this section argues that the revenue rule should be reduced in the civil 
RICO context in recognition of contemporary concerns in a global economy. 
A. Separation of Powers Concerns 
While neither political branch expressly consented to the E.C.’s claim, 
both branches have signaled their implied consent to civil RICO claims 
asserted by foreign governments against cigarette-makers.  The legislative 
history of the Patriot Act indicates that Congress approves of such claims.  In 
addition, the executive branch’s consent should be presumed because the 
E.C.’s claim would have furthered the international law enforcement policy of 
eradicating organized crime and terrorism. 
First, the legislative history of the Patriot Act is strong evidence of 
Congress’s intent to expose cigarette-makers to civil liability under RICO.  
Granted, legislative intent to depart from a well-settled principle of law must 
be expressed in unequivocal language.247  However, the revenue rule is not a 
well-settled principle of law.  As the Supreme Court in Pasquantino found, the 
“line . . . between impermissible and permissible ‘enforcement’ of foreign 
revenue law has . . . always been unclear.”248  The Court examined revenue 
rule jurisprudence beginning with Lord Mansfield’s earliest formulation of the 
doctrine.249  The Court concluded “that the extent to which the revenue rule 
barred indirect recognition of foreign revenue laws was unsettled as of 1952,” 
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the year in which Congress enacted the federal wire fraud statute.250  RICO 
was enacted in 1970.251  Little change in revenue rule jurisprudence occurred 
between 1952 and 1970.252  The Pasquantino Court’s conclusion that the 
revenue rule was unsettled law should apply as well to the analysis in the civil 
RICO context.  Therefore, because the revenue rule does not qualify as a well-
settled principle of law, something less than “unequivocal [statutory] 
language” should suffice as persuasive evidence of legislative intent. 
The deletion of the rule of construction from the Patriot Act is therefore 
sufficient evidence of legislative intent to reduce the scope of the revenue rule.  
The Supreme Court has recognized the act of deletion as persuasive evidence 
of legislative intent.  For example, deletion of a statutory definition is 
persuasive evidence of Congress’s intent to leave to the courts the 
responsibility of providing a definition.253  Here, Congress considered the issue 
of civil RICO claims brought by foreign governments against cigarette-makers 
and decided to delete the rule of construction from the Patriot Act that would 
have exempted cigarette-makers from such civil liability.254  Therefore, the 
Second Circuit should have been more willing to read the deletion of the rule 
of construction as evidence of legislative intent to approve the E.C.’s claim 
against the defendant cigarette maker.255 
The section-by-section analyses, each submitted to one of the Houses of 
Congress, indicate that the deletion of the rule of construction was studied and 
intentional.256  The Supreme Court has previously found such analyses 
persuasive legislative history, especially where the separate analyses are 
consistent.257  The Second Circuit itself had previously observed that it must be 
presumed that “[t]he legislators . . . knew exactly what they were doing” when 
both a House and Senate report contain the “same statement.”258  Moreover, 
more recent and more specific legislative action should prevail as an indicator 
of legislative intent over earlier, more general legislative action.259  Because 
the changes to the Patriot Act speak directly to the issue of civil RICO claims 
brought by foreign governments against cigarette-makers, the Second Circuit 
 
 250. Id. at 368. 
 251. See 18 U.S.C. § 1965 (2000). 
 252. No published federal court opinion mentioning the revenue rule could be found between 
the years 1952 and 1970. 
 253. See, e.g., United States v. Louisiana, 394 U.S. 11, 39 (1969); United States v. California, 
381 U.S. 139, 150–60 (1965). 
 254. European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d 175, 179–80 (2d Cir. 2005). 
 255. See also Serbin v. Ziebart Int’l Corp., 11 F.3d 1163, 1177–78 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing 
a deletion as evidence of congressional intent). 
 256. European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d 123, 134 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 257. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 447 n.8 (1982). 
 258. Willis v. United States, 719 F.2d 608, 612 (2d Cir. 1983). 
 259. See, e.g., HCSC-Laundry v. United States, 450 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1981) (holding that a newer 
exemption prevailed over an older, more generic exemption). 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
230 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 51:203 
should have been more willing to accept the changes as an expression of 
legislative intent. 
Second, executive consent to the E.C.’s claim should be presumed because 
the claim was consistent with the government’s avowed policies of combating 
organized crime,260 terrorism,261 and the detrimental health effects of 
smoking.262  The United States has signed a number of treaties that express the 
government’s policy in favor of providing support to foreign governments on 
these particular issues.  For example, the United States is party to the Palermo 
Convention,263 which requires member nations to assist in reducing organized 
crime that takes place across international borders.264  The Palermo Convention 
requires member nations to establish as domestic offenses money laundering, 
corruption, and conspiracy to commit fraud.265  The Palermo Convention is an 
example of an international agreement signed by the executive branch that 
represents that branch’s policy of cooperating with foreign governments in the 
eradication of racketeering activity of the type alleged by the E.C.’s claim. 
Moreover, because civil RICO claims serve important domestic law 
enforcement interests, it should be presumed that the executive branch would 
have endorsed the E.C.’s claim.266  Civil RICO claims, by definition, are 
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brought by private individuals, or “private prosecutors.”  Civil RICO thereby 
helps alleviate the significant demands placed on prosecutor resources.  Law 
enforcement interests have argued that barring certain civil RICO claims “is 
virtually certain to increase the work load of federal law enforcement officers, 
because, in the fight against organized crime, they will not receive the private 
support which Congress intended to provide through RICO.”267  In recognition 
of this important crime-fighting function, civil RICO claims are broadly 
construed.268 
Civil RICO claims like the one brought by the E.C. can be used as an aid 
in the war on terrorism. 269  Cigarette-smuggling operations have been 
employed to fund terrorist activities.270  Terrorists often avoid fund-raising 
efforts that create a “paper trail” and instead focus on black market activities 
like “cigarette smuggling, credit card fraud and check forgery, to raise 
cash.”271  The result is millions of dollars for terrorist operations.272  Therefore, 
in light of the broad construction of civil RICO and the Executive policy of 
supporting the international effort to eradicate organized crime and terrorism, 
the Second Circuit erred in requiring direct Executive involvement or express 
Executive consent to the E.C.’s claim. 
In sum, because the E.C.’s claim fell within a domestic statute and was 
favored by executive branch policy, the Second Circuit overstated the 
separation of powers concerns.  The claim presented little risk that the 
judiciary would infringe on the foreign policy duties reserved by the 
Constitution to the executive branch.  The court was asked to interpret the 
racketeering provisions of a domestic statute.  Like the wire fraud prosecution 
in Pasquantino, the E.C.’s claim only incidentally recognized foreign tax law.  
There was no risk of embarrassment here because the political branches had 
already signaled their approval of these claims through the amendments and 
accompanying legislative history of the Patriot Act and through the signing of 
treaties like the Palermo Convention. 
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B. National Sovereignty Concerns 
National sovereignty concerns are acute where a claim or prosecution 
amounts to the extraterritorial enforcement of a foreign tax law.273  Therefore, 
whether these concerns are present depends on the characterization of the suit.  
The Court in Pasquantino characterized the wire fraud prosecution as the 
direct enforcement of a domestic statute that incidentally recognized foreign 
tax law.274  The prosecution was viewed as an exercise of national sovereignty, 
rather than an “invasion” of the courts by another sovereign’s tax laws.275  In 
contrast, the Second Circuit in European Community I and II characterized the 
civil RICO claim brought by the E.C. as a suit that primarily sought to enforce 
a foreign tax law.276  The court focused on the fact that the E.C. sought 
recovery of lost tax revenue and law enforcement costs.277  As will be shown 
below, the court mischaracterized the E.C.’s suit and overstated the national 
sovereignty concerns. 
The E.C.’s claim should have been characterized as the direct 
“enforcement” of a domestic statute that merely recognized foreign tax law.  
The Court in Pasquantino concluded that a wire fraud prosecution should be 
characterized as the direct enforcement of a domestic statute even though it 
incidentally enforced a foreign tax law.278  Here, the E.C.’s claim fell squarely 
within the provisions of a domestic statute, civil RICO.  The revenue rule 
should not apply where “American law renders an activity—including the 
violations of foreign tax laws—an American tort or crime.”279  The revenue 
rule should not apply then when a claim enforces a domestic statute through 
the mechanism provided by Congress, even though that claim incidentally 
enforces a foreign tax law. 
Civil RICO requires a calculation of damages based on the economic harm 
caused by a violation of the statute.280  That this calculation is based on foreign 
tax revenue is not sufficient to implicate the revenue rule.  In European 
Community II, the court concluded that the “whole object” of a civil RICO 
claim brought by a foreign government was “to collect tax revenue and the 
costs associated with its collection.”281  This conclusion is not consistent with 
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Pasquantino.282  There, the Court considered the argument that the recovery of 
taxes was the object of the wire fraud prosecution “because restitution of the 
lost tax revenue [was] required under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act 
of 1996.”283  The Court reiterated that the wire fraud prosecution furthered a 
domestic law enforcement interest stating, “The purpose of awarding 
restitution in this action is not to collect a foreign tax, but to mete out 
appropriate criminal punishment for that conduct.”284  Likewise, the purpose of 
awarding treble damages to civil RICO plaintiffs is to mete out punishment for 
criminal racketeering activity.285  This proposition is supported by Sedima 
where the Court explained that “RICO was an aggressive initiative to 
supplement old remedies and develop new methods for fighting crime.”286  As 
the Court has elsewhere noted, civil RICO “bring[s] to bear the pressure of 
‘private attorneys general’ on a serious national problem for which 
prosecutorial resources are deemed inadequate; the mechanism chosen to reach 
the objective in . . . RICO is the carrot of treble damages.”287  Congress sought 
to encourage parties like the E.C. to bring suit under civil RICO through the 
promise of treble damages based on lost tax revenue.  The Second Circuit’s 
decision effectively eviscerates the impact of this “carrot” by holding that the 
plaintiffs’ objective, which is admittedly a recovery of foreign tax revenue, 
should control the determination of whether a claim is a direct enforcement of 
a foreign tax law. 
Therefore, European Community II mischaracterized the E.C.’s civil RICO 
claim as the direct enforcement of a foreign tax law.  Based on the reasoning of 
Pasquantino, a claim that falls within the provisions of a domestic statute does  
 
 282. See Pasquantino v. United States, 544 U.S. 349, 364 (2004). 
 283. See id. at 365 (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3663A–3664 (2000)). 
 284. See Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 365. 
 285. See Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 F.3d 103, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, 
J., dissenting) (“[Foreign] tax laws come into play only indirectly, as a factor to be used in the 
calculation of damages, and do so entirely because the RICO statute itself makes the [foreign] 
laws relevant to that calculation.”).  Elsewhere, in explaining the treble damages provision of civil 
RICO, the Court has said, “The object of civil RICO is thus not merely to compensate victims but 
to turn them into prosecutors, ‘private attorneys general,’ dedicated to eliminating racketeering 
activity.”  Rotella v. Wood, 528 U.S. 549, 557 (2000).  Although admitting that civil RICO is to 
be broadly construed, the Court in Rotella held that the object of “encouraging potential private 
plaintiffs diligently to investigate” would be hampered if civil RICO were read so as to allow an 
excessive limitations period.  Id. at 558 (quoting Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & 
Assocs., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 151 (1987)); see also United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 585 
(1981) (“The aim [of civil RICO] is to divest the association of the fruits of its ill-gotten gains.”). 
 286. Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 498 (1985). 
 287. Agency Holding Corp., 483 U.S. at 151. 
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not amount to extraterritorial enforcement of foreign tax law.  Although the 
civil RICO claim might have incidentally recognized foreign tax law, 
Pasquantino makes clear that this is not sufficient to trigger the revenue 
rule.288 
C. The Isolationist Impact of a Broad Reading of the Revenue Rule289 
Not only does an expansion of the revenue rule conflict with the narrow 
reading of the revenue rule supplied by the Court in Pasquantino, but it also 
limits access to the federal court system because a claim against U.S. cigarette-
makers incidentally recognizes foreign tax law will hamper a number of U.S. 
objectives, including those belonging to law enforcement interests and 
established foreign policy. 
First, expanding the revenue rule to bar civil RICO claims brought by 
foreign governments will impede domestic law enforcement efforts to fight 
organized crime and terrorism.  As discussed above, the private prosecutor 
mechanism supplements governmental efforts to fight the war on terrorism and 
organized crime.290  Terrorist and organized crime groups enjoy a steady 
 
 288. Pasquantino, 544 U.S. at 368. 
 289. Although this section discusses the isolationist impact of European Cmty. I and II, the 
response to the Second Circuit’s decisions is not likely to be entirely negative.  For example, U.S. 
investors are likely to welcome decisions in which foreign governments are barred from filing 
civil RICO claims that allege foreign tax evasion.  See Bruce Zagaris, Ethical Issues in Offshore 
Planning, ALI-ABA INTERNATIONAL TRUST AND ESTATE PLANNING 199, 230 (2005).  The 
Pasquantino decision to reduce the scope of the revenue rule was a source of great concern to tax 
lawyers: 
The decision should concern U.S. professionals, especially accountants, lawyers, bankers, 
real estate advisers, and security advisers who help advise on foreign laws, especially in 
countries that have significant tax crimes.  Inevitably, they use the U.S. wires or mails in 
the advice. . . . [C]ertain economic sectors may be more vulnerable than others.  For 
instance, due to the dynamic upsurge in the energy sector, many foreign governments are 
aggressively trying to extract more revenue from the sector by auditing and bringing 
criminal actions against foreign operators . . . .  Many of these cases lead to lengthy 
disputes, the outcomes of which are costly and uncertain. 
Id. at 230.  Rather than expanding the revenue rule to protect investors, the more prudent 
approach would be to require investors to scrutinize their portfolios to make certain that their 
investments are free of foreign tax law violations.  See generally Marian Hagler, International 
Money Laundering and U.S. Law: The Need to “Know-Your-Partner”, 31 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. 
& COM. 227, 227 (2004) (detailing the importance of exercising “due diligence” prior to investing 
in an emerging market in order to comply with the complex and wide-reaching U.S. money 
laundering laws). 
 290. See Brief for FLEOA, supra note 177, at 2. 
Law enforcement personnel obviously cannot be everywhere doing everything necessary 
to enforce the laws of the United States.  Investigative and prosecutorial resources are 
spread thin as a result of the combination of budget limitations and the widespread, and 
growing, nature of crime.  This is especially so in the realm of organized crime, where the 
greed for big money inspires cunning minds to engineer complicated criminal strategies to 
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stream of financial support.291  Additionally, terrorist groups are more difficult 
to monitor due to increasing opportunities to conceal fundraising efforts that 
have developed in the global and Internet age.292  Civil RICO’s private 
prosecutor provisions are effective in alleviating some of the pressure on 
government prosecutors because attorneys for private plaintiffs have an ethical 
duty to pursue with zeal even the most “technical violation” of RICO.293  The 
Second Circuit’s decisions in European Community I and II therefore sacrifice 
the important law enforcement interests that drive civil RICO. 
Second, expanding the revenue rule to protect cigarette-makers also 
undermines joint international efforts to curb the detrimental health effects of 
tobacco use.  Thirty percent of cigarette exports are distributed through “black 
market” enterprises like the one at the core of the E.C.’s claim.294  The 
detrimental health effects of tobacco use are undeniable.295  Moreover, the 
detrimental fiscal effects of cigarette smuggling are obvious because the 
revenue derived from cigarette taxes is often the primary source of funding for 
social programs in developing nations.296  For example, cigarette tax revenue is 
the primary source of funding for schools and hospitals in Colombia, where the 
government also mounted a civil RICO claim against U.S. cigarette-makers.297   
 
avoid detection and arrest.  When organized crime becomes international, as it does in 
cigarette smuggling and money laundering, . . . the drain on law enforcement resources is 
severe. 
Id.; see also Tom Lininger, A Better Way to Disarm Batterers, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 525, 532 n.30 
(2003) (listing the federal government’s “overriding concern for combating terrorism after the 
tragedy of September 11, 2001,” as a major factor in the low federal prosecution rate in domestic 
abuse cases); Newman Flanagan, 36 FEB PROSECUTOR 6, 12 (2002) (“[L]ocal prosecutors noted 
that they lacked the experience and training, as well as the resources, to be effective in preventing 
and detecting terrorism.”). 
 291. See, e.g., Larry D. Newman, RICO and the Russian Mafia: Toward a New Universal 
Principle Under International Law, 9 IND. INT’L. & COMP. L. REV. 225, 227 (1998) (noting that 
organized crime syndicates in Europe exchange over $350 billion annually). 
 292. See Brief for FLEOA, supra note 177, at 2. 
 293. Douglas E. Abrams, Crime Legislation and the Public Interest: Lessons From Civil 
RICO, 50 SMU L. Rev. 33, 36 (1996); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.3 cmt. 1 
(1983). 
 294. World Bank, Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco 
Control (1999), at 63, available at http://www1.worldbank.org/tobacco/book/pdf/tobacco.pdf. 
 295. See, e.g., National Center for Chronic Disease Prevention and Health Promotion, Health 
Effects of Cigarette Smoking: Fact Sheet, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/factsheets/HealthEffectsof 
CigaretteSmoking_Factsheet.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2006). 
 296. Brief of World Health Organization as Amicus Curiae In Support of the Position of the 
European Community and the Member States and Reversal of the Judgment of the District Court, 
at 7 n.3, European Cmty. v. R.J.R. Nabisco, Inc., 424 F.3d 175 (2d Cir. 2005) (Nos. 02-7330, 02-
7325) [hereinafter Brief of WHO]. 
 297. Id. 
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The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (the FCTC) was created as a 
response to the health and fiscal damage caused by cigarette smuggling.298  
The FCTC requires participating nations to cooperate in an effort to eliminate 
“[i]llicit trade in tobacco products.”299  The United States signed the FCTC on 
May 10, 2004, thereby signaling its endorsement of the international effort to 
combat cigarette smuggling.300  Barring a cause of action by foreign 
governments that fall victim to cigarette smuggling schemes therefore 
undermines this aspect of U.S. foreign policy. 
D. The Scope of the Revenue Rule Should Be Reduced in the Civil RICO 
Context 
The revenue rule should be reduced so as to permit foreign governments to 
bring civil RICO claims against corporations involved in racketeering activity 
that deprives foreign governments of tax revenue.  The revenue rule is a judge-
made doctrine that has been modified in the past to comport with 
contemporary concerns.301  For example, as discussed above, the doctrine 
originally developed out of the judicial interest in protecting English merchants 
from foreign trade laws.302  Courts should be willing to adjust the parameters 
of the revenue rule in recognition of contemporary concerns. 
The revenue rule is an archaic common law doctrine that offers little value 
in a global economy.303  When Lord Mansfield first enunciated the revenue 
rule in Boucher v. Lawson, the English economy sensed a threat from 
protectionist foreign tax laws.304  The revenue rule therefore developed out of 
“extremely nationalistic legal and tax structures.”305  Two hundred years later, 
 
 298. World Health Organization, WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (2003), 
at 5, available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/WHO_FCTC_english.pdf. 
 299. Id. 
 300. World Health Organization, Updated Status of the WHO Framework Convention on 
Tobacco Control, available at http://www.who.int/tobacco/framework/countrylist/en/print.html. 
 301. See West, supra note 32, at 1065. 
 302. Id. 
 303. See Kovatch, supra note 54, at 266; see also Att’y Gen. of Canada v. R.J. Reynolds, 268 
F.3d 103, 137 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) (Calabresi, J., dissenting) (“The argument [that domestic courts 
are incompetent to interpret foreign law] is, to put it mildly, dubious in a global economy, which 
requires a great amount of interpretation of foreign laws.”).  See generally Barbara A. Silver, 
Modernizing the Revenue Rule: The Enforcement of Foreign Tax Judgments, 22 GA. J. INT’L & 
COMP. L. 609 (1992). 
 304. See supra 35–51 and accompanying text; Silver, supra note 303, at 613. 
 305. Silver, supra note 303, at 613 (“The rule supported these domestic policies [of trade 
protectionism] because the end result of an English court refusing acknowledgement of a foreign 
revenue law was often to promote British trade that would otherwise have been unlawful.”).  In 
fact, the Missouri Court of Appeals has noted: 
[In the early revenue rule cases] the question presented was whether a contract made to 
evade a foreign revenue law or which did not comply with the revenue laws of the locus 
contractus, was enforceable in England; and, in each case, the ruling was based upon a 
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however, globalization has eroded international borders.306  Fervent 
nationalism, of the type underlying the first revenue rule cases, could trigger a 
shock wave that would be felt in many nations in a world where national 
economies have become so interdependent.307 
Moreover, the traditional justifications for the revenue rule carry less 
weight in a global economy.308  The judicial competence justification asserts 
that domestic courts are incompetent to interpret foreign tax law.309  However, 
globalization has, of course, resulted in an increase in international litigation 
that necessarily requires courts to interpret foreign laws.310  In most instances, 
courts have competently managed this responsibility.311  Globalization also 
creates “greater opportunities for criminal organizations to cross borders and 
function on a global level.”312  Therefore, law enforcement interests are better 
served by increased cooperation among peer nations in combating racketeering 
schemes like those at issue in European Community I and II.  An isolationist 
common law doctrine like the revenue rule is inconsistent with these 
international law enforcement interests. 
 
desire to promote commercial convenience. . . . [The revenue rule] was the product of the 
commercial world, and arose at a time where there was great commercial rivalry and 
international suspicion. 
State ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Rodgers, 193 S.W.2d 919, 922, 927 (Mo. Ct. App. 1946) 
 306. See Steven V. Melnik, Corporate Expatriations—The Tip of the Iceberg: Restoring the 
Competitiveness of the United States in the Global Marketplace, 8 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. 
POL’Y. 81, 93 (2004). 
 307. See Silver, supra note 303, at 617–18. 
 308. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 
483, Reporters’ Note 2 at 613 (“In an age when virtually all states impose and collect taxes and 
when instantaneous transfer of assets can be easily arranged, the rationale for not recognizing or 
enforcing tax judgments is largely obsolete.”); Banco Frances e Brasileiro S.A. v. Doe No. 1, 331 
N.E.2d 502, 505–06 (N.Y. 1975) (“[M]uch doubt has been expressed that the reasons advanced 
for the [revenue] rule, if ever valid, remain so . . . in light of the economic interdependence of all 
nations.”). 
 309. Banco Frances e Brasileiro, 331 N.E.2d at 505–06. 
 310. See Roger J. Miner, The Reception of Foreign Law in the U.S. Federal Courts, 43 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 581, 581 (1995) (“The global economy has brought an increasing variety of foreign law 
issues to the federal courts.  Indeed, one international commercial transaction may implicate the 
law of several nations.”). 
 311. See id. at 586 (“[F]ederal courts have shown a commendable ability to get their hands 
around foreign law when fully briefed on the issues.”); see, e.g., Seetransport Wiking Trader 
Schiffahrtsgesellschaft MBH & Co. v. Navimpex Centrala Navala, 29 F.3d 79, 79–80 (2d Cir. 
1994) (examining a ruling of the Paris Court of Appeals to determine whether an arbitration 
award was enforceable under the New York Uniform Foreign Money-Judgments Recognition 
Act). 
 312. Newman, supra note 291, at 226. 
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For the foregoing reasons, courts should continue the trend that began with 
Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., and was reinforced most recently by 
Pasquantino and reduce the scope of the revenue rule.  The revenue rule 
should not apply in the civil RICO context where there is a cognizable law 
enforcement interest furthered by the claim.  Because the E.C.’s claim would 
have furthered the law enforcement interest of eradicating organized crime, the 
revenue rule should not have applied in European Community I and II. 
CONCLUSION 
The Second Circuit in European Community I and II held that the E.C.’s 
claim was barred by the revenue rule because the political branches had not 
given their express consent to the suit and because the suit amounted to the 
extraterritorial enforcement of foreign tax law.313  The court’s separation of 
powers and national sovereignty concerns were nevertheless overstated.  The 
executive and legislative branches had both given their implied consent to civil 
RICO claims like the one brought by the E.C.  In light of the important 
domestic law enforcement interests at stake in the E.C.’s claim, such implied 
consent should have been sufficient to overcome separation of powers 
concerns.  Additionally, the court’s national sovereignty concerns were 
overstated because the claim should have been characterized as the direct 
enforcement of a domestic statute rather than the direct enforcement of a 
foreign tax law. 
Admittedly, foreign policy concerns might have been triggered to a 
marginal degree by the E.C.’s suit, but the Second Circuit’s broad reading of 
the revenue rule is in conflict with a number of legal and political 
considerations: the Supreme Court’s narrow reading of the revenue rule in 
Pasquantino, the executive branch’s avowed domestic policy of eradicating 
organized crime and terrorism, and the executive branch’s avowed foreign 
policy of combating the ill-effects of tobacco use on a global scale.  In 
recognition of these considerations, the scope of the revenue rule should be 
reduced in the civil RICO context. 
In any event, European Community I and II represent a convergence of 
dual bodies of law.  There is the obvious convergence of a domestic statute, 
civil RICO, and the E.C.’s excise tax on cigarettes, a foreign tax law.  At 
bottom, however, these cases represent the convergence of a statute designed 
to solve the contemporary dilemmas of organized crime and an archaic 
common law doctrine that seemed barely to cling to life after Pasquantino.  In 
other words, the “delicate inquiry” that once prompted caution now demands 
reformulation in a world that shares little in common with the world in which 
Lord Mansfield and Judge Hand developed and inflated the revenue rule 
 
 313. European Cmty. II, 424 F.3d 175, 177 (2d Cir. 2005); European Cmty. I, 355 F.3d 123, 
123 (2d Cir. 2004). 
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doctrine.  The Second Circuit in European Community I and II effectively 
rejected this important reformulation and turned back the clock on revenue rule 
jurisprudence. 
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